Side Letters In Venture Capital Transactions

Venture Capital Side Letters Partnership

Introduction : A side letter is a separate agreement that grants an investor specific rights, such as more frequent financial reporting, director nomination rights or access to information required by internal policies or regulations. It allows investors to negotiate these rights without changing the main investment agreement.

The main concern is whether these rights can be enforced against the portfolio company. A side letter binds its signatories but does not automatically bind a company that has not signed it. Further, multiple side letters may create conflicting obligations, particularly during future funding rounds, exits or an IPO.

This article examines the gap between the right granted, the document recording it and the party expected to honour it. It explores the relationship between side letters, shareholders’ agreements and articles of association, the enforcement of fund-level promises against portfolio companies, and the impact of investor-specific rights on corporate governance. It also considers SEBI’s rules on differential rights within Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), which do not, by themselves, resolve the question of enforceability against portfolio companies.

Legal Provisions

The laws and regulations relevant to venture capital side letters in India primarily comprise the following:

Companies Act, 2013: Section 6 provides the general rule that the Act shall prevail over any conflicting provision in a company’s articles or agreements. Section 10 makes the articles of the company binding on the company and its members and Section 14 deals with alterations to the articles of association. In addition, Section 58(2) (as amended by the Companies Act, 2018) provides that agreements relating to transfer of securities are deemed to be contracts enforceable between the parties. Additionally, Sections 166, 177 and 188 of the Companies Act are relevant where the side letters contemplate audit committee approvals or related party transactions and require the directors, including nominee directors, to act in the company’s interest and not merely for the benefit of the appointing investor.

Indian Contract Act, 1872: Whereas Sections 10 and 23 thereof concern valid contracts and lawful agreements, Section 37 therein stipulates performance of a promise by the parties to a contract. Such provisions may be useful in determining if a side letter binds the parties to whom it is disclosed. However, the Indian Contract Act does not impose any obligations on a company or other person who is not a party to the contract or agreement.

SEBI Regulations: Regulation 31B of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 therein deals with special rights granted to shareholders of a listed company, which shall require such rights to be approved by the shareholders by way of special resolution and subject to review at specified intervals. With respect to Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 govern the rights granted to investors and such rights are required to comply with applicable requirements and not prejudice the interests of other investors.

Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA): In respect of investments by a      non-resident in an Indian company, the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 and FEMA are relevant. In particular, Rule 2(k) of the said Rules therein deals with optionality clauses, subject to lock-in and exit pricing conditions. Rule 21 of the said Rules therein also deals with pricing of instruments applicable to an exit by a non-resident investor.

Legal Analysis

Enforceability of Side Letters

A side letter is binding upon the parties who have signed it but not necessarily upon the company or other shareholders. It must be read in conjunction with the company’s articles of association and any other applicable documents. For example, in V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan , the Supreme Court held that a share-transfer restriction not contained in the articles could not bind the company. Similarly, in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India , the Court described shareholders’ agreements as private contracts between the parties involved. In contrast, the Delhi High Court in World Phone India Pvt. Ltd. v. WPI Group Inc. considered whether a veto right contained in a shareholders’ agreement could bind the company in the absence of such a term in the articles, amongst other related issues.

Information Rights

In addition to providing investors with access to additional financial reports, business updates or other information, side letters may give them rights of disclosure. It is important that any such rights are clearly set out so as to indicate what information is required to be provided, how frequently it must be provided and any restrictions that may apply. The imposition of different reporting requirements across a number of side letters can create additional burdens on the company and may also cause difficulties in protecting confidential information.

MFN Clauses

Most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses allow an investor to claim any more favourable rights that have been granted to another investor in any side letter, subject to the terms in the MFN clause. This protects such investor from being treated less favourably than other investors but may cause additional obligations for the company. For example, an investor may use an MFN clause to assert enhanced reporting rights granted to another investor, which could cause the company to have to contend with multiple deadlines with varying notice requirements and potentially competing rights claims. An MFN clause must therefore clearly state the rights that the investor is entitled to claim, the eligible investors, any election deadlines and exclusions.

Governance Rights

Investors may seek to negotiate rights such as nomination rights to the Board or vetoes or approvals of key business decisions; such rights must be exercised consistently with the shareholders’ agreement, articles of association and applicable company law; inconsistencies between these documents can cause uncertainty as to who must approve a particular matter and on what basis such rights are actually enforceable; such rights should therefore be explicitly set out in any company documents they apply to.

Confidentiality Obligations

Side letters to confidentiality terms are used by investors to ensure that terms that apply to them individually are not disclosed. At the same time, obligations should not be imposed that do not allow the company to disclose information necessary to fulfill its obligations. Therefore, agreements should provide for the right to disclose information on a confidential basis, as required by law, and as necessary for the Board of Directors, legal advisors, auditors, and regulators. This allows the company to protect the information provided from unauthorized use while protecting itself from the risk of concealing information that other investors need for their decisions or for future transactions.

These rights may conflict with each other. For example, confidentiality obligations may restrict the disclosure of information permitted by an MFN clause, and governance rights may require such a clause to be included in the articles of association. Therefore, side letters should be interpreted consistently to resolve conflicts between the parties’ obligations.

Fund-Level Rights and Company Obligations

Regulations 20(21) and 20(22) of the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012, as amended, relate to pro-rata treatment and differential rights, subject to applicable conditions.

A fund may make promises to an investor regarding certain rights that require action by a portfolio company not party to the side letter. The promises made by the fund do not automatically bind the company to perform the obligations. The company’s obligations must therefore be closely examined since compliance at the fund level does not necessarily lead to enforceability against the portfolio company.

Foreign Investment and Exit Risks

A side letter between a portfolio company and a non-resident investor could include a put option, an exit right or a damages provision. Such rights and undertakings would need to comply with the relevant Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) framework, including pricing and share transfer rules.

A dispute in NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd. concerning a contractual exit arrangement between a foreign investor and the company had important ramification for the enforceability of such arrangements. However, the case does not mean that assured-return clauses are generally valid under Indian foreign investment rules.

Exit rights could also come into play in the context of an initial public offering (IPO) or sale context. Matching rights, consent requirements and options may curtail a buyer’s options or delay a transaction. The applicability of Regulations 30A and 31B of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 may depend upon the terms of any agreement and the rights that are being claimed.

Case Laws

V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan, (1992) 1 SCC 160

Supreme Court addressed a share transfer restraint not contained in the articles of association of the company. This case is useful in determining whether a contractual restriction may be imposed against the company or its shareholders generally.

Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613

The judgment is useful to distinguish between the rights arising under a contract and rights that are enforceable against the company or a third party. It explains why a side letter is not binding on non-signatories.

Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1

Supreme Court clarified the circumstances when a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement. The judgment is relevant to disputes between related entities, but it does not mean that every affiliate will be deemed a party to a side letter.

NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., Delhi High Court April 2017

Delhi High Court dealt with enforcement of an arbitral award arising out of a shareholders’ agreement. This case is relevant to exit-related disputes with foreign investors, but should not be taken as approval of assured returns structures.

Practical Implications

Implications for investors

Investors should analyse the side letters they sign to make sure that the rights are properly worded and provide the level of protection intended before they sign the letters. They should pay particular attention to the disclosure of information, confidentiality, most-favoured-nation clauses, co-investment rights, and remedies in the case of default. Institutional investors should check whether their fiduciary duties or other legal obligations require them to negotiate specific protections for their investors, which should be explicitly stated in the letter.

Implications for fund managers

Fund managers have to balance the needs of major investors with the desire to avoid conflicting obligations in different side letters. Keeping a central register of all the side letters may help them keep track of the rights that have been granted, their signing dates, any disclosure requirements, expiry dates and MFN elections.

Fund managers should before granting special rights relating to fund distributions, voting, investment allocation or decision-making consult whether such rights are permitted under the fund documents and that they do not violate SEBI regulations.

Implications for founders and portfolio companies

During funding rounds, founders may face the need to accept various rights granted to the individual investors, including the rights to inspect board meetings and obtain additional information, approve particular decisions, or prioritize participation in subsequent funding.

While such rights may improve the attractiveness of the deal, they may complicate the management and future fundraising process. Thus, it is critical to differentiate the fund’s promises, the company’s obligations, and the rights that should be granted through the shareholder’s agreement or articles of association.

Moreover, side letters should be crafted to avoid the discrepancy in rights between different investors and ensure the absence of restrictions in the fundraising for the portfolio companies.

Practical Recommendations: Making Side Letters Work

Maintaining a record of side letters is an important exercise but not enough. An appropriate review process is required.

An efficient process should involve the following key steps.

Maintaining a central register: There should be a central register recording all side letters with the parties they apply to, the rights conferred, the duration, required approvals, MFN clauses, confidentiality obligations, amendments and any conditions of termination or revival. Fund managers should also engage with portfolio companies on commitments made to investors.

Document comparisons before signing: Every proposed side letter should be compared against the shareholders’ agreement, articles of association, subscription documents and existing side letters. It identifies conflicting terms, additional veto rights, overlapping reporting requirements and the implications of MFN clauses.

Approvals and applicable parties: The implications of the proposed rights should be evaluated on other investors, founders, directors, employees and the company. There should also be checks on the requirement for board or shareholder approvals, amendments to the articles and whether it complies with SEBI and FEMA requirements.

Tracking obligations and expiry: Responsibility for meeting reporting requirements and other obligations should be assigned for every side letter. It is important to review the register before a new round of funding, restructuring, IPO or sale to identify the obligations that survive termination and claims that are due or may revive.

The objective is not to abolish side letters or insist in all arrangements being made public but to ensure that every right is carefully considered before it is given, accurately recorded and effectively monitored to ensure when circumstances change it is re-evaluated. This way investors can negotiate different terms while limiting the risks of conflicting rights, unfair advantages and unwelcome liabilities at the time of exit.

Conclusion

Side letters provide the flexibility for venture capital investors to tailor negotiate rights that suit their specific needs. But there are a number of issues that can occur if these rights conflict with the main investment documents, involve parties who have not agreed to them, or do not have the necessary approvals. Governance rights may be hard to enforce if not properly reflected in the company’s constitutional documents. MFN clauses may extend benefits beyond what was expected, while fund-level promises can impose obligations on portfolio companies.

Although SEBI regulates differential rights among AIF investors, questions about their enforceability against portfolio companies must be considered on their own. Each side letter should therefore clearly state where the right is recorded, who is responsible for fulfilling it, and when it expires or will be renewed. By addressing these issues, disagreements can be avoided, unexpected liabilities eliminated and future funding rounds and exits more straightforwardly managed.

Author:- Aishwarya Satosh Ledange, in case of any queries please contact/write back to us at support@ipandlegalfilings.com or   IP & Legal Filing.

Endnotes

  1. SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012, Regulations 17A, 20(7), 20(21) and 20(22), including the relevant amendments.
  2. Indian Contract Act, 1872, Sections 10 and 23.
  3. Companies Act, 2013, Sections 6, 58(2) and 166.
  4. Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019, Rule 2(k) and Rule 21.
  5. SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, Regulations 30A and 31B.

Cases

  1. V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan, (1992) 1 SCC 160.
  2. Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613.
  3. Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1.
  4. NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., Delhi High Court, 28 April 2017.

Secondary sources

  1. Ravi Prakash and Sugyan Kumar Singh, “Differential Investor Rights in Accredited Investors Only Funds: Mapping the Pari-Passu Exemption” (Corporate Professionals, 25 September 2026)
  2. IndiaCorpLaw, “Conflicts between Shareholders Agreements and Articles of a Company” (6 June 2013).
  3. Vaish Associates, “Standard Setting Forum for AIFs Releases Implementation Standards”.
  4. AZB & Partners, “SEBI Co-Investment Scheme Framework” (16 September 2025).
  5. Abhishek Malhotra, “Enforcement of Put Option in Contracts Providing Assured Exit Returns” (Bar & Bench).
  6. Sidharrth Shankar and Vidur Prabhakar, ‘Enforceability of Additional, Non-Conflicting Rights in Shareholders’ Agreements vis-à-vis Articles of Association’ (JSA, October 2020) https://www.jsalaw.com/?p=3939 
  7. Nidhi Ladha, ‘Legality of Shareholders’ Agreements: Can Shareholders Agree Outside the Articles?’ (Vinod Kothari Consultants, 2024) https://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Legality-of-shareholders-agreements-by-nidhi-ladha-in-template.pdf